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Abstract 
The European Court of Human Rights has generated a significant volume of case law that imposes 
demanding standards on States Parties to prevent, investigate and remedy ill-treatment of children 
at the hands of private actors. However, confusion and inconsistency is evident on a number of key 
points. Similar cases are decided on different grounds; and the approach to whether the right to an 
effective remedy under Article 13 has been violated is erratic. This creates uncertainty as to what is 
required of States to implement judgments, and makes it more difficult for similarly situated victims 
to vindicate their rights without bringing repetitive applications to Strasbourg. This article provides 
the first comprehensive treatment of Convention obligations to protect children from ill-treatment. 
It identifies problematic aspects of the case law, and proffers a more coherent body of principles 
that would provide greater clarity regarding what the ECHR requires of States Parties in the sphere 
of child protection, and regarding the measures of implementation required of States in cases where 
violations are found. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the late 1990s, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has generated a significant 
volume of case law governing the State’s positive obligations to protect children from abuse and 
neglect at the hands of private actors, drawing primarily on the right to freedom from inhuman and 
degrading treatment under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Within 
this case law, concepts of positive and procedural obligations have been applied to a wide variety of 
circumstances, and now impose demanding standards on the child protection systems of States 
Parties to prevent, respond to, investigate and remedy ill-treatment of children. However, the 
reasoning of the Court within these various cases does not always entirely line up, and some 
confusion and inconsistency is evident on a number of key points. Similar cases are decided on 
different grounds, often for no apparent reason; and the approach to whether the right to an 
effective remedy under Article 13 has been violated is erratic and at times unconvincing. This creates 
uncertainty as to what is required of States to implement judgments, and makes it more difficult for 
similarly situated victims to vindicate their rights without bringing repetitive applications before the 
hugely overburdened Strasbourg Court. 
These issues are not unique to the jurisprudence on child protection: inconsistency in case law of the 
ECtHR has been documented in various areas, including in groups of cases relating to children’s 
rights (Alves de Faria, 2015; Bracken, 2017). Nor are they unique to the ECHR: Monica Hakimi argues 
that the approach in international human rights law generally to the duty of the State to protect 
individuals from human rights abuses at the hands of private actors is splintered, inconsistent and 
conceptually confused (Hakimi, 2010:349-354). Nonetheless, while the ECtHR does not always 
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achieve consistency, it certainly aspires to do so. Although the ECtHR does not operate a formal 
system of precedent (and is willing to depart from its own previous decisions), it has stated that it 
‘usually follows and applies its own precedents, such a course being in the interests of legal certainty 
and the orderly development of the Convention case-law.’1 Moreover, the Court has adopted a 
number of measures designed to combat inconsistencies, such as referring or relinquishing cases to 
the Grand Chamber; the work of the Jurisconsult, and the Conflict Resolution Committee (Costa, 
2008:450-452; White and Boussiakou, 2009:180-182). Indeed, in some judgments, the Court has 
overruled previous decisions for the express reason of putting an end to uncertainty in the case law.2 
Thus, where conflicts within bodies of related cases can be identified as having slipped through this 
net, and workable solutions proposed, it is important that this be done. 
This article aims to assist lawyers to formulate effective child protection arguments based on the 
ECHR (whether before domestic courts or before the ECtHR itself), and to assist the Court to resolve 
the inconsistencies and conceptual challenges arising from the case law to date. To this end, it fills a 
gap in existing literature by providing the first comprehensive sketch of the outlines of States 
Parties’ Convention obligations to protect children from ill-treatment; by identifying problematic 
aspects of the case law; and by proffering solutions that would bring about a more coherent body of 
principles that could be applied in a workable fashion in future cases. The net effect of this would be 
to provide greater clarity regarding what the ECHR requires of States Parties in the sphere of child 
protection, and regarding the measures of implementation required of States in cases where 
violations are found. It would raise standards of human rights protection for children who are 
victims of or at risk of ill-treatment, while also bolstering the subsidiarity of the Convention to 
national law. This would assist to reduce the number of repetitive applications brought by similarly 
situated victims (a matter of necessity, since the backlog of cases before the Court stands in the 
region of 60,000 applications). 
 
2. Convention Obligations on Child Protection 
The child protection case law of the ECtHR has been primarily grounded in Article 3, which provides 
that ‘[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’ 
However, not all cases are dealt with under this provision. More serious cases involving loss of life 
are dealt with under Article 2 (the right to life). For non-fatal cases, the Court has established a 
minimum threshold of severity necessary to bring it within the definition of inhuman and degrading 
treatment under Article 3.3 Cases involving less serious breaches of personal integrity that do not 
reach this threshold may instead be treated as violations of the right to private life under Article 8. 
Less common, but displaying a similar approach, are forced labour cases involving a violation of 
                                                          
1 Cossey v United Kingdom (10843/84, 27 September 1990) at §35. Multiple subsequent judgments have stated 
that the Court should not depart, without good reason, from precedents laid down in previous cases; see, e.g., 
Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom (28957/95, 11 July 2002) at §74; Mamatkulov and Abdurasulovic v Turkey, 
(46827/99 and 46951/99, 6 February 2003) at §105; and Vilho Eskelinen v Finland (63235/00, 19 April 2007) at 
§56. See further Mowbray (2009). 
2 See, e.g., Pellegrin v France (28541/95, 8 December 1999) at §60-61 and Perez v France (47287/99, 12 
February 2004) at §54-56. 
3 Ireland v United Kingdom (5310/71, 18 January 1978) at §162: ‘ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of 
severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3 (art. 3). The assessment of this minimum is, in the nature of 
things, relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its 
physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim …’ For examples of 
the application of this standard to the ill-treatment of children, see, e.g., Tyrer v United Kingdom (5856/72, 25 
April 1978) at §28-35; contrast with Costello-Roberts v United Kingdom (13134/87, 25 March 1993) at §29-32. 
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Article 4. Finally, where any of those provisions are transgressed, Article 13 (right to an effective 
remedy) may also come into play. 
Whichever provision is involved, the basic principle is the same: children should be protected from 
ill-treatment that violates the Convention right in question. The most obvious obligation imposed on 
the State is the negative obligation to refrain from inflicting harm on children under State control 
(e.g. in State institutions such as residential care, schools or hospitals).4 Issues relating to school 
discipline engage State responsibility even in private schools, since education is a State function and 
the State cannot absolve itself of responsibility by delegating its obligations to private bodies or 
individuals.5 However, the majority of child abuse and neglect occurs at the hands of private actors; 
this is where the case law becomes more complex, and this is the primary focus of this article. Cases 
involving private actors are more complicated in terms of establishing a line of responsibility to the 
State; but nevertheless, the Court has grappled quite effectively with this problem. The Convention 
has been interpreted by the ECtHR in a manner that imposes demanding obligations on States 
Parties, and which is increasingly influenced by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC).6 These obligations include procedural obligations to investigate complaints of ill-
treatment (which will be considered in Part 3 below), and substantive obligations to protect children 
from ill-treatment (to which attention will now turn). The remainder of Part 2 will provide the 
necessary background on the scope of these obligations, before focusing on inconsistencies arising 
in the case law regarding which provisions of the Convention have been violated. 
 
2.1 Effective deterrence 
At a basic level, States Parties to the ECHR are obliged to enact criminal laws that provide an 
effective deterrent to ill-treatment of children that meets the minimum level of severity to bring it 
within the meaning of ‘inhuman and degrading treatment’ under Article 3. This echoes the emphasis 
on prevention in General Comment No. 13 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, which 
expressly calls for the explicit prohibition of all forms of violence against children.7 Unlike the CRC, 
the ECHR case law has not yet required criminalisation of less serious breaches of personal integrity 
(such as mild corporal punishment) that fall outside the scope of Article 3; however, recent decisions 
are trending in that direction (O’Mahony, 2019). 
The ECHR obligation to criminalise serious instances of ill-treatment of children can be traced back 
to A v United Kingdom (25599/94, 23 September 1998), which concerned a boy whose stepfather 
had repeatedly caned him, but was subsequently acquitted of assault on the defence of reasonable 
chastisement. The ECtHR stated that: 
… the obligation on the High Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the Convention to secure 
to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, 
taken together with Article 3, requires States to take measures designed to ensure that 
individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading 
                                                          
4 See, e.g., VK v Russia (68059/13, 7 March 2017) (in which a violation of Article 3 was found in respect of ill-
treatment of a child in a public nursery school). 
5 Costello-Roberts v United Kingdom (13134/87, 25 March 1993) at §27. 
6 On the obligation to protect children from violence under the CRC, see Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
(2011); Svevo-Ciancia et al, (2011) and Sandberg (2018). For an analysis of the influence of the CRC on the case 
law of the ECtHR, see Kilkelly (2001). More recent child protection case law now cites the CRC almost as a 
matter of course; see O’Mahony (2019). 
7 Committee on the Rights of the Child (2011) at §46. 
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treatment or punishment, including such ill-treatment administered by private individuals … 
Children and other vulnerable individuals, in particular, are entitled to State protection, in 
the form of effective deterrence, against such serious breaches of personal integrity. (§22) 
Since the applicant had been subjected to corporal punishment of such severity to constitute 
inhuman and degrading treatment, but the jury had nevertheless acquitted his stepfather of assault, 
the Court found that the law did not provide adequate protection to the applicant against treatment 
contrary to Article 3 (§23-24). 
MC v Bulgaria (39272/98, 4 December 2003) took a very similar stance in relation to an inadequate 
system of investigating and prosecuting rape complaints involving a 14 year-old girl. The Court found 
that the principle of effective deterrence obliges States not just to enact laws criminalising rape, but 
also to apply them in practice through effective investigation and prosecution (§150-153). Bulgaria 
was found to fall short of its obligations under both Articles 3 and 8 (a point that will be returned to 
in Part 2.4 below) by virtue, inter alia, of the fact that its rape laws made it difficult to prosecute in 
the absence of the use of significant force by the perpetrator; key witnesses were not confronted; 
and the authorities ‘attached little weight to the particular vulnerability of young persons and the 
special psychological factors involved in cases concerning the rape of minors’ (§169-187). A lack of 
an effective investigation may also violate a State’s procedural obligations under Article 3, even if 
the criminal law itself is deemed to be an effective deterrent; it will be seen in Part 3 below that that 
the dividing line between substantive and procedural obligations has been blurred by the Court in its 
reasoning in this case, among others. 
The obligation to enact criminal laws providing effective deterrence against ill-treatment of children 
has also been applied in the context of forced labour. In Siliadin v France (73316/01, 26 July 2005), a 
violation was found of Article 4 where a 15 year-old girl was forced to carry out domestic duties 15 
hours a day, 7 days a week with no pay and very little freedom of movement. Although she did 
succeed in obtaining damages against the perpetrators, a criminal conviction was quashed on 
appeal. In determining that the applicant had been subjected to forced labour and held in servitude, 
the Court repeatedly emphasised her status as a minor (§118, 120, 126 and 129), and held that the 
absence of a criminal conviction failed to discharge France’s positive obligations under Article 4 to 
protect children from forced labour (§135-149). 
In cases of ill-treatment which may not necessarily reach the Article 3 threshold, there is a separate 
obligation deriving from Article 8 to enact effective laws to protect children from abusive conduct. 
Söderman v Sweden (5786/08, 12 November 2013) concerned a 14 year-old girl whose stepfather 
had secretly filmed her while taking a shower, but whose prosecution in the Swedish courts was 
ultimately unsuccessful. Unlike in the case law on Articles 3 and 4, the Court accepted in principle 
that the criminal law was not the only way in which a State might fulfil its obligations under Article 8, 
and that the civil law might be sufficient (§108).8 Nonetheless, the need for ‘effective deterrence 
against such serious breaches of personal integrity’ applies in the case of Article 8 in the same way 
as for Article 3 (§81). Since no remedy was available in either the criminal or civil law in the concrete 
                                                          
8 Contrast this with MC v Bulgaria (39272/98, 4 December 2003), in which the Court expressly held at §186 
that ‘effective protection against rape and sexual abuse requires measures of a criminal-law nature’ and 
rejected the suggestion that civil redress might suffice for ill-treatment that falls within the Article 3 threshold. 
However, in cases where the perpetrators of ill-treatment are below the age of criminal responsibility, the 
Court has accepted that the obligation to criminalise does not arise: see Dordevic v Croatia (41526/10, 24 July 
2012) at §142. 
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circumstances of the case, the Court found a violation of Article 8 as it was ‘not satisfied that the 
relevant Swedish law … ensured protection of her right to respect for her private life’ (§117). 
 
2.2. Preventive measures that mitigate foreseeable risks 
Convention obligations extend beyond deterring ill-treatment through criminal or civil consequences 
for perpetrators. States are also obliged to take reasonable measures to mitigate foreseeable risks of 
ill-treatment occurring. This can arise in two contexts: i) a specific risk to an identified individual, and 
ii) a general risk to unidentified individuals. This echoes the CRC requirement that States engage in 
both ‘general (primary) and targeted (secondary) prevention’ (Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
2011:§46). 
In relation to identified individuals, a number of cases have found violations due to a failure to 
adequately respond to domestic violence. Kontrová v Slovakia (7510/04, 31 May 2007) concerned 
two children who were shot dead by their father. Five days previously, the father had threatened to 
shoot their mother (the applicant), and she had made several reports to the police. The Court 
observed that the duty to take preventive measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from 
the criminal acts of another individual could not arise in every claimed risk to life, since this would 
impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities: 
For a positive obligation to arise, it must be established that the authorities knew or ought 
to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an 
identified individual from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take 
measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been 
expected to avoid that risk … (§49-50) 
Nonetheless, the Court found that the situation in the applicant’s family was known to the police, 
but they failed to discharge their obligations under domestic law (including registering the 
applicant's criminal complaint; launching a criminal investigation immediately; keeping a proper 
record of the emergency calls and advising the next shift of the situation; and taking action in 
respect of the allegation that the applicant's husband had made violent threats with a shotgun). The 
direct consequence of these failures was the death of the applicant's children, and accordingly, the 
Court found a violation of Article 2 (§52-55). A similar decision was reached in Talpis v Italy 
(41237/14, 2 March 2017), and the same principle was applied in the context of a risk of abuse 
rather than a risk to life in E v United Kingdom (33218/96, 26 November 2002). 
The duty to protect against foreseeable risks was extended beyond specific risks to identified 
individuals to include general risks to unidentified individuals by the Grand Chamber in O’Keeffe v 
Ireland (35810/09, 28 January 2014).9 This case concerned an eight year-old girl who was the victim 
of multiple sexual assaults by the principal of a primary school which was owned and managed by 
the Catholic Church. The same principal had abused 21 girls on almost 400 occasions at the same 
school. A number of complaints were made against him before he was eventually moved to a 
different school. State authorities did not discover any of this until after his retirement, when 
criminal complaints were made against him; the only official measure in place in the 1970s was a 
memorandum instructing schools to direct complaints against teachers to the school manager 
(almost invariably the local parish priest) (§62 and 163). 
                                                          
9 See further O’Mahony and Kilkelly (2014) and Gallen (2015). 
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The failure by the State to respond to the first complaint against the principal, which had been made 
before the applicant was abused, was one aspect of the decision.10 However, O’Keeffe went further 
in a crucial respect, in that it was not solely predicated on a failure to respond to actual abuse; the 
mere risk of abuse was enough to engage a positive obligation.11 The Court relied on evidence from 
official reports on the incidence of sexual abuse of children in Ireland to find that the risk of abuse 
occurring in schools was foreseeable. Accordingly, as it was a risk of which the State had or ought to 
have had knowledge, the State should have taken steps to protect children against that risk. Its 
failure to do so was found to violate Article 3 (but not Article 8, as will be discussed in Part 2.4 
below): 
The Court has found that it was an inherent positive obligation of government in the 1970s 
to protect children from ill-treatment. It was, moreover, an obligation of acute importance 
in a primary education context. That obligation was not fulfilled when the Irish State, which 
must be considered to have been aware of the sexual abuse of children by adults through, 
inter alia, its prosecution of such crimes at a significant rate, nevertheless continued to 
entrust the management of the primary education of the vast majority of young Irish 
children to non-State actors (National Schools), without putting in place any mechanism of 
effective State control against the risks of such abuse occurring … (§169) 
As O’Keeffe is the only judgment to date in which a violation has been found on this basis of a 
general risk to unidentified children, the precise scope of this obligation is as yet unclear.12 
Nonetheless, as with risks to identified individuals, States cannot choose to ignore foreseeable 
general risks and fail to put in place any measures to control against them. 
 
2.3 Responding to known abuse or neglect 
As noted by the Committee on the Rights of the Child in General Comment No. 13, ‘commitment to 
prevention does not lessen States’ obligations to respond effectively to violence when it occurs’ 
(Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2011:§46). In a similar vein, the ECHR obliges states to 
respond to actual ill-treatment that is already occurring, in circumstances where the State knows or 
ought to know about the ill-treatment. This includes an obligation to respond to i) direct harm to 
children and ii) indirect harm caused by witnessing ill-treatment of others. In relation to direct harm, 
the case of Z v United Kingdom (29392/95, 10 May 2001) concerned a failure by social services to 
take adequate measures to secure the welfare of four children who were subjected to appalling 
levels of neglect, as well as physical and sexual abuse in the family home. A period of four and a half 
years elapsed between social services first coming into contact with the family and the point at 
which they were taken into care (at the behest of their mother), during which time they endured 
‘horrific’ experiences causing serious psychological harm (§40). The Court acknowledged ‘the 
difficult and sensitive decisions facing social services and the important countervailing principle of 
                                                          
10 §166: “Any system of detection and reporting which allowed such extensive and serious ill-conduct to 
continue for so long must be considered to be ineffective … Adequate action taken on the 1971 complaint 
could reasonably have been expected to avoid the present applicant being abused two years later by the same 
teacher in the same school.” 
11 In this respect, the case is analogous to case law governing positive obligations arising under Article 2 in 
respect of activities that pose a risk to life: see, e.g., Öneryildiz v Turkey (48939/99, 30 November 2004) at §89-
90. 
12 One potentially difficult issue to be overcome in the development of this principal is the establishment of a 
causal link between the State’s failure and the ill-treatment suffered by the victim; see Stoyanova (2018). 
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respecting and preserving family life’, but went onto find that ‘[t]he present case, however, leaves 
no doubt as to the failure of the system to protect these applicant children from serious, long-term 
neglect and abuse’ (§74). Thus, the failure by the authorities to remove the children from the family 
home for a lengthy period of time after first becoming involved was found to have violated the 
children’s rights under Article 3. A similar decision was reached in respect of a failure to respond to 
ongoing domestic violence and against an 8 year-old child in TM and CM v Moldova (26608/11, 28 
January 2014).  
These cases can be contrasted with DP and JC v United Kingdom (38719/97, 10 October 2002), which 
also concerned a family with a lengthy history of involvement with social services, and in which 
several children were subjected to sexual abuse over a lengthy period of time. However, no violation 
was found in DP and JC. The mother had covered for the abusive stepfather, and there was no 
evidence that the children had made unequivocal complaints to State authorities of sexual abuse. It 
was thus held that the State neither knew nor had reason to suspect that abuse was occurring, and 
could not be criticised for failing to investigate the possibility of abuse (§110-114). More recently, in 
MP v Bulgaria (22457/08, 15 November 2011), the Court also declined to find a violation of either 
Article 3 or Article 8 in a case where a complaint that a child had been abused by his stepfather had 
not (yet) been substantiated. All appropriate steps were taken to investigate and respond to the 
complaint, including multiple medical and psychological assessments; visits by social workers to the 
child’s home; and the provision of assistance and counselling to his family. These two cases stand 
out as illustrative of the limits of State obligations under the ECHR in the child protection sphere. Of 
over 20 judgments of the ECtHR concerning positive obligations to protect children from ill-
treatment by private actors, they are the only ones in which alleged or documented ill-treatment did 
not result in a violation being found of one of the substantive provisions of the Convention.13 
Violations have also been found due to a failure to respond to known ill-treatment at the hands of 
other children. Dordevic v Croatia (41526/10, 24 July 2012) is not strictly speaking a child protection 
case, since the first applicant was not a child, but an intellectually disabled adult subjected to 
prolonged harassment by children who attended a school where he attended a workshop for adults 
for 12 hours a week. Nonetheless, the circumstances of the case are clearly salient in the context of 
child protection and prevention of bullying in schools. It was held that the totality of the harassment 
(which included verbal abuse, harassment at his apartment and, on one occasion, burning with 
cigarettes) reached the Article 3 threshold (§90-96). The State had been made aware of the ill-
treatment through complaints made by the applicant’s mother, but had not taken all reasonable 
measures to prevent the abuse, notwithstanding the fact that the continuing risk of such abuse was 
real and foreseeable; accordingly, a violation of Article 3 was found (§141-150). 
In addition to direct harm, the State’s duty to protect children from ill-treatment includes indirect 
harm to children caused by witnessing domestic violence.14 In Eremia v Moldova (3564/11, 28 May 
2013), a violation of Article 3 was found in respect of the failure of the authorities to adequately 
                                                          
13  Note, however, that in DP and JC v United Kingdom, a violation was found of the right to an effective 
remedy under Article 13; see below, Part 4. A further example of a rejection of a complaint of a substantive 
violation is M and M v Croatia (10161/13, 3 September 2015), in which the Court rejected the complaint as 
‘the domestic authorities took reasonable steps to assess and weigh the risk of potential ill-treatment of the 
first applicant by her father and to prevent it’, noting the close supervision of applicant in father’s home and 
the absence of evidence indicating that she was at risk by living there (§153-162). However, a procedural 
violation was found due to delays in the investigation; in addition, a violation of Article 8 was found due to the 
failure to provide the child with an adequate opportunity to be heard. 
14 This was included in the definition of ‘mental violence’, and thus as coming within the scope of Article 19 of 
the CRC, in General Comment No. 13: see Committee on the Rights of the Child (2011) at §21. 
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respond to serious and ongoing domestic violence against the first applicant (the mother). A 
separate violation was found (notably, of Article 8 rather than of Article 3) in respect of the second 
and third applicants (the teenage daughters of the first applicant) due to the adverse effects 
suffered by them as a result of repeatedly witnessing their father’s violence against their mother in 
the family home. 
 
2.4 Inconsistencies in the Substantive Obligations Case Law 
Even at the basic level of deciding which provision of the Convention has been violated, there is 
evidence of inconsistency in the case law. Since there is a minimum threshold of severity that must 
be reached before a case can be brought within Article 3, it is clear that not all cases that constitute 
a violation of personal integrity under Article 8 will involve ill-treatment of sufficient severity to 
amount to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3. But what of the converse 
situation? If the threshold for violating Article 8 is lower, will all cases of inhuman and degrading 
treatment contrary to Article 3 also constitute violations of personal integrity under Article 8? 
One line of cases answers this question in the affirmative; the two provisions are bundled together 
in the analysis, with no separate consideration of the facts grounding the violation, the submissions 
made by the parties or the case law governing each provision. The Court simply stipulates that both 
provisions have been violated, with no consideration of the differences between the rights at 
stake.15 By contrast, in a parallel line of judgments, the Court separates out the two provisions, and 
then – having found a violation of Article 3 – rules it unnecessary to consider the arguments made 
under Article 8.16 Again, in almost every case, no explanation is given for the approach taken. 
As almost none of the cases articulate the reasons underpinning the approach taken by the Court, 
and there is no engagement between the two lines of cases, it far from clear why some cases have 
found a violation of both provisions while others rule out the need for a separate analysis under 
Article 8. Some of the confusion may stem from the fact that any good lawyer will argue both 
provisions in an application to the Court, so that Article 8 provides a fall-back in case the ill-
treatment complained of is found not to meet the Article 3 threshold. However, while this is 
understandable on the part of lawyers, the failure to properly and consistently separate out the two 
complaints is less understandable on the part of the Court, which repeatedly describes itself as ‘the 
master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of a case’ and stresses that it is ‘not 
bound by the characterisation given by the applicant or the Government’.17 The Court may claim to 
                                                          
15 See, e.g., MC v Bulgaria (39272/98, 4 December 2003); ES v Slovakia (8227/04, 15 September 2009); CAS and 
CS v Romania (26692/05, 20 March 2012) and MGC v Romania (61495/11, 15 March 2016). See also MP v 
Bulgaria (22457/08, 15 November 2011), in which the two provisions were considered together (citing the 
approach in MC v Bulgaria), but in which no violation was ultimately found. 
16 See, e.g., Z v United Kingdom (29392/95, 10 May 2001); E v United Kingdom (33218/96, 26 November 2002); 
IG v Moldova (53519/07, 15 May 2012); O’Keeffe v Ireland (35810/09, 28 January 2014); TM and CM v 
Moldova (26608/11, 28 January 2014); and IC v Romania (36934/08, 24 May 2016). In M and M v Croatia 
(10161/13, 3 September 2015) at §143, the Court declined to consider the Article 8 complaint, noting that it 
was ‘absorbed’ by the Article 3 complaint. See also PM v Bulgaria (49669/07, 24 January 2012), in which the 
applicant relied on both Articles 3 and 8, but the Court – having acknowledged this at the outset of the 
consideration of the complaint (see §54) – proceeded to simply ignore Article 8 in the remainder of the 
judgment. 
17 See, e.g., Assenov v Bulgaria (24760/94, 28 October 1998) at §132; Söderman v Sweden (5786/08, 12 
November 2013) at §57; M and M v Croatia (10161/13, 3 September 2015) at §167; MGC v Romania 
(61495/11, 15 March 2016) at §48; and Talpis v Italy (41237/14, 2 March 2017) at §77. 
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shape the cases to fit the case law, but its approach to complaints under both Articles 3 and 8 
displays no discernible trend in either time or court personnel; indeed; opposite approaches were 
taken in MGC v Romania (61495/11, 15 March 2016) and IC v Romania (36934/08, 24 May 2016), 
decided on almost identical facts just two months apart by chambers consisting of six out of seven of 
the same judges. 
There is one case in which the Court has attempted to explain its decision to decline to consider the 
Article 8 complaint. In O’Keeffe v Ireland (35810/09, 28 January 2014), the Court, having found a 
violation of Article 3, stated the following:  
The Court notes that the complaint under Article 8 concerns the same facts and issues 
evoked under Article 3 and that the parties relied on essentially the same submissions. The 
case does not concern a particular and separate Article 8 issue, such as the specific home 
and family life matters to which the facts of the above-cited case of C.A.S. and C.S. v. 
Romania gave rise (§ 12). The impact of the abuse on the applicant’s later life can equally be 
a consequence of the Article 3 breach established above. The Court concludes that the 
complaint under Article 8 does not give rise to any issue separate to that examined already 
under Article 3 of the Convention … (§192) 
In principle, the idea that a separate violation of Article 8 should hinge on facts that are specific to 
home and family life (rather than a mere re-statement of the circumstances that grounded the 
violation of Article 3) makes sense. However, the existence of a clear and consistently-applied 
distinction of this nature is not supported by the case law. The Court’s citation of CAS and CS v 
Romania (26692/05, 20 March 2012) as an example of a case giving rise to such ‘specific home and 
family life matters’ is unconvincing, since the Court in CAS and CS rejected part of the Article 8 
complaint which was based on the applicants being forced to leave town to reconstruct a normal life 
(§60).18 The only other ‘specific home and family life matters’ that can be identified in the case is the 
fact that the abuse was perpetrated within the family home. However, this cannot explain the 
difference of approach. In almost all of the cases cited above in which the Court declined to consider 
Article 8 separately, the ill-treatment had occurred in the family home; while conversely, in a 
number of the cases in which a violation of both provisions was found, the ill-treatment took place 
outside of the applicant’s home.19 Moreover, the judgment in CAS and CS made no reference to any 
‘specific home and family life matters’ when giving its reasons for finding a violation of both Articles 
3 and 8 (§73-83). 
Dordevic v Croatia (41526/10, 24 July 2012, §151-153) provides an illustration of a genuinely 
separate Article 8 violation, albeit in respect of a separate applicant: the ill-treatment of the first 
applicant contrary to Article 3 was found to give rise to a separate violation of the Article 8 rights of 
the second applicant (his mother), due to the impact it had on her private and family life.20 There is 
no clear illustration in the case law to date of facts that might give rise to separate and clearly 
distinguishable violations of both Articles 3 and 8 in respect of the ill-treatment of a single applicant. 
Thus, the presence or absence of ‘specific home and family life matters’ does not presently offer a 
principled dividing line on this point in the manner suggested by the Court in O’Keeffe; but it is 
                                                          
18 ES v Slovakia, 8227/04, 15 September 2009 might provide another example, since in that case, the 
applicants were forced to flee the family home and a separate violation of Article 8 was found. However, since 
the Government admitted that it had failed to meet its positive obligations under both Articles 3 and 8, and 
contested only the admissibility of the application, the relatively brief judgment of the Court did not provide 
any analysis of why a separate violation of Article 8 should be found. 
19 MC v Bulgaria (39272/98, 4 December 2003) and MGC v Romania (61495/11, 15 March 2016). 
20 See also Eremia v Moldova (3564/11, 28 May 2013). Both of these cases are discussed above, Part 2.3. 
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plausible that it could perform this role in future, if the Court were to attempt to resolve the 
inconsistencies discussed in this Part, and suitable cases were to arise. 
In all likelihood, nothing in particular turns on the Court’s inconsistent approach to finding violations 
of one or both provisions. In all of the above cases, the applicant succeeded in establishing a 
violation under the higher and non-derogable standard set under Article 3. A finding of a separate 
violation under Article 8 would not have added anything either to the outcome of the case at hand 
or to the general measures that would be expected of the respondent state in executing the 
judgment. But the inconsistencies in the case law on this point are indicative of a certain lack of 
rigour on the part of the Court in its jurisprudence on child protection. As will be seen in Parts 3 and 
4 below, this spills over into other issues, where more obvious consequences flow from 
inconsistencies in the judgments. 
In the interests of legal certainty, the approach that best lends itself to a clear and consistent 
application would be for the Court, in cases where a violation of Article 3 is found, to decline to 
consider the Article 8 complaint if it is based on essentially the same facts. The finding of a violation 
of Article 3 is sufficient to vindicate the rights of the applicant and to require general measures of 
the respondent State to prevent similar violations in future. If some clearly distinguishable factual 
issue can be identified that grounds a separate violation of Article 8, then the complaint should of 
course be considered, and a violation found if appropriate. However, for clarity, the Court should 
give its reasoning in a separate section of the judgment instead of bundling the two provisions 
together. Lawyers, for their part, should continue to cite both provisions if in doubt about the 
severity of the treatment; but in cases clearly reaching the Article 3 threshold (such as any form of 
sexual assault), there is nothing to be gained by making a separate Article 8 complaint. 
 
3. Procedural Obligations 
Part 2 was concerned with States Parties’ substantive obligations to prevent ill-treatment from 
occurring, or to respond to it where the State is or ought to be aware that it is occurring. It was seen 
that the case law here was generally quite strong in imposing demanding obligations on States and 
achieving a high level of protection for the rights of children, albeit that inconsistency is evident on 
the question of whether complaints under Articles 3 and 8 should be taken together or separately. 
Part 2 will turn attention to procedural obligations to investigate complaints of ill-treatment. Here, 
the jurisprudence is a little more patchy. While the Court has imposed high standards on States and 
has not shied away from finding violations, it has not always articulated its judgments with the 
consistency and clarity that might be expected. This has potential to cause confusion as to why 
precisely a violation has been found, and what is required of a State in executing the judgment. 
 
3.1 Scope of Procedural Obligations 
Where a violation of the right to life under Article 2 of the ECHR is alleged to have occurred, it is 
firmly established that States Parties have a procedural obligation to carry out an effective 
investigation into the alleged incident.21 After some initial inconsistency in the case law (Mowbray, 
2002), the same obligation now seems similarly well-established in cases involving an alleged 
violation of the right to freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3. 
                                                          
21 See, e.g., McCann v United Kingdom, 18984/91, 27 September 1995; Ergi v Turkey, 23818/94, 28 July 1998; 
Jordan v United Kingdom, 24746/94, 4 May 2001; and Ramsahai v Netherlands, 52391/99, 15 May 2007. 
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Furthermore, the Court has not excluded the possibility that a similar obligation could arise in 
respect of alleged violations of Article 8 (albeit that this has yet to be clearly established in a case 
based solely on Article 8).22 
In the context of abuse against children, the leading case on the procedural obligations arising under 
Article 3 is CAS and CS v Romania (26692/05, 20 March 2012), which concerned an investigation into 
an allegation of repeated serious and violent sexual abuse of a seven year-old boy. The Court set out 
the key principles as follows: 
… Article 3 requires that the authorities conduct an effective official investigation into the 
alleged ill-treatment even if such treatment has been inflicted by private individuals … 
For the investigation to be regarded as ‘effective’, it should in principle be capable of leading 
to the establishment of the facts of the case and to the identification and punishment of 
those responsible. This is not an obligation of result, but one of means. The authorities must 
have taken the reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the 
incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence, and so on. Any 
deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries 
or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard, and a 
requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit in this context (§69-70). 
The Court made specific reference to Articles 19, 34 and 39 of the CRC, as well as General Comment 
No. 13, noting in particular the Committee’s emphasis on the importance of prevention, the need for 
an easily accessible report mechanism, the importance of rigorous and child-sensitive investigation 
and of effective and child-friendly justice where due process must be respected (§52-53).23 It 
summarised that the CRC requires that ‘a series of measures must be put in place so as to protect 
children from all forms of violence which includes prevention, redress and reparation’ (§72). 
The investigation in the case at hand was found to be ineffective on the basis of a combination of 
factors, including delays in commencing it and in progressing key aspects24 (such as questioning the 
alleged perpetrator25), showing evidence of a ‘lax attitude’ on the part of the authorities (§74-79). 
The authorities ‘did not try to weigh up the conflicting evidence and made no consistent efforts to 
establish the facts by engaging in a context-sensitive assessment’, and placed undue emphasis on 
the fact that the child and his family did not make a complaint for some time after the alleged 
events: 
… the Court considers that the authorities were not mindful of the particular vulnerability of 
young people and the special psychological factors involved in cases concerning violent 
sexual abuse of minors, particularities which could have explained the victim’s hesitations 
both in reporting the abuse and in his descriptions of the facts. (§79-81) 
                                                          
22 MC v Bulgaria, 39272/98, 4 December 2003 at §152. 
23 In so finding, the Court cited the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2011) at §45-58. 
24 See also PM v Bulgaria (49669/07, 24 January 2012) at §63-67, in which delay of more than 10 years in the 
investigation of the rape of a 13 year-old girl, with the result that the prosecution of the perpetrators was 
eventually time-barred, led to a finding of a violation. 
25 See also IG v Moldova (53519/07, 15 May 2012) at §40-45, in which a violation was found in respect of the 
investigation of the rape of a 14 year-old girl due largely to the fact that the decision to drop the charges was 
made without two of the three key witnesses being questioned and without any attempt made to establish the 
credibility of the statements made by the applicant and the alleged perpetrator (e.g. by questioning people 
who could have shed light on their trustworthiness). 
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Moreover, no proper counselling services were provided to the child, which was not consistent with 
the need to provide adequate measures for recovery and integration (§82). This latter point goes 
beyond the scope of mere investigation of the alleged offences and is particularly influenced by 
Article 39 of the CRC. 
 
3.2 Confusion between Substantive and Procedural Obligations 
The dividing line between substantive and procedural obligations is not always as clear as it might 
be. On its face, there are two distinctions. One relates to timing: substantive violations arise where 
the State fails to do something prior to or during the ill-treatment, while procedural violations relate 
solely to the aftermath of the ill-treatment. The other relates to substance and culpability: a 
substantive violation involves a finding that the State is partly responsible for the occurrence of the 
ill-treatment (whether by failing to deter it, mitigate the risk of it or respond to it once occurring), 
whereas a procedural violation does not hinge on State culpability for the ill-treatment, but arises 
even where substantive obligations have been discharged and the State is found not to bear any 
responsibility for the ill-treatment in question. Indeed, a procedural violation can arise even in 
circumstances where it has not been satisfactorily established that ill-treatment actually occurred. In 
Assenov v Bulgaria (24760/94, 28 October 1998), a 14 year-old boy alleged that he had been beaten 
with truncheons by police in the course of arresting him; while it was held that the evidence did not 
substantiate this allegation, a violation was nonetheless found as the investigation into his complaint 
of ill-treatment was not sufficiently thorough. 
On the question of timing, cases involving a single instance of ill-treatment are comparatively clear-
cut regarding whether State failures occurred before or after the event (and thus fall to be classified 
as substantive or procedural). However, cases involving the abuse or neglect of children often 
involve a series of related events, which may be spread over a period of months or even years and 
do not lend themselves to identifying a clear ‘before’ and ‘after’. A complaint made to State 
authorities at any point in the sequence will trigger the procedural obligation to investigate the 
allegation of ill-treatment; and depending on the circumstances, it may also trigger the substantive 
obligation to respond to the ill-treatment and to take measures to prevent further instances.26 As 
such, the Court has stated that substantive and procedural violations ‘often overlap’.27 Indeed, in 
several judgments, the Court has referred to inadequate investigations creating a ‘situation of 
impunity’.28 This suggests, without clarifying the terminology, that procedural violations may 
eventually reach a point where the law fails to provide an effective deterrent or fails to prevent a re-
occurrence of ill-treatment (which would be a substantive violation).  
Nonetheless, while overlap can arise, it is still both important and possible to separate out which 
category of violation has been found, and on the basis of which failures. It is important because it 
determines the nature of the failure in the case and the measures of implementation required of the 
respondent State in executing the judgment; and it is possible because, notwithstanding the overlap 
                                                          
26 See, e.g., MP v Bulgaria (22457/08, 15 November 2011) at §110 and M and M v Croatia (10161/13, 3 
September 2015) at §140-141. 
27 M and M v Croatia (10161/13, 3 September 2015) at §136. 
28 See IC v Romania (36934/08, 24 May 2016) at §55: ‘… the Court is of the view that failure to properly 
investigate or provide appropriate judicial response to complaints of sexual abuse against children or other 
vulnerable persons such as persons with intellectual disabilities creates a background of impunity which may 
be in breach of the State’s positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention.’ See also Talpis v Italy 
(41237/14, 2 March 2017) at §117. 
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in the circumstances giving rise to the obligations, the obligations themselves are still clearly 
distinguishable. Every violation can still be categorised as a substantive violation (failing to 
deter/prevent), a procedural violation (failing to investigate) or both. 
Sometimes, the Court is exceptionally clear in its approach; a good example is O’Keeffe v Ireland 
(35810/09, 28 January 2014), where the judgment considered the alleged substantive and 
procedural violations under separate headings that expressly used the terms ‘substantive’ and 
‘procedural’.29 The Court concluded that even though a substantive violation had occurred due to 
the failure to take steps to mitigate the risk of sexual abuse in primary schools, there was no 
separate procedural violation, as the perpetrator of the applicant’s abuse was prosecuted shortly 
after complaints were first made to the police (§170-174). 
This separation of substantive and procedural obligations is noticeably absent from some of the 
other cases, and not just those involving a protracted sequence of ill-treatment. The best example is 
MC v Bulgaria (39272/98, 4 December 2003).30 As noted in Part 2.1 above, this case found a 
violation of Articles 3 and 8 against Bulgaria due to the manner in which a case involving a double 
rape of a 14 year-old girl was handled by the authorities. Yet it is unclear from the judgment whether 
the violation turned on the ineffectiveness of the criminal laws in question (in which case it would be 
a substantive violation similar to A v United Kingdom (25599/94, 23 September 1998), due to the 
absence of an effective deterrent); the ineffectiveness of the investigation of the offences (in which 
case it would be a procedural violation); or both. 
The Court began by examining the definition of the offence and the requirement to show physical 
force and physical resistance in order to establish that a rape had occurred; but this aspect was not 
found to ground a violation in itself (§170). Instead, the Court stated, ‘[w]hat is decisive … is the 
meaning given to words such as “force” or “threats” or other terms used in legal definitions.’31 The 
applicant alleged that there was ‘restrictive practice’ in respect of the definition of these terms in 
Bulgaria, and the Court found that it would be sufficient to ground a violation if it found that this 
position was ‘based on reasonable arguments and has not been disproved by the Government’ 
(§174). So while the wording of the law did not in itself ground a violation, the interpretation and 
application of that law in practice could do. The judgment focused on a trend in the interpretation 
and application of the law, which was not dissimilar to the trend in the interpretation and 
application of the defence of reasonable chastisement that grounded a violation in A v United 
Kingdom. Both cases involved an allegation that while a criminal offence existed, the manner in 
which the law in question was interpreted and applied made it extremely difficult to secure a 
conviction, and thus failed to provide a sufficient deterrent.32 Indeed, while the Court did not cite A v 
United Kingdom, it used almost identical language to that case in holding that ‘effective deterrence 
against grave acts such as rape, where fundamental values and essential aspects of private life are at 
                                                          
29 The judgment was separated into the following sections: ‘II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE SUBSTANTIVE 
ASPECT OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION (§122) and ‘III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE PROCEDURAL ASPECT 
OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION’ (§170). Headings were also used to separate out the two aspects in VK v 
Russia (68059/13, 7 March 2017) (in which both substantive and procedural violations were found). For an 
example of a similar approach in a case not involving children, see Cestaro v Italy (6884/11, 7 April 2015). 
30 Other cases that illustrate this tendency to bundle substantive and procedural obligations together include 
MGC v Romania (61495/11, 15 March 2016) and IC v Romania (36934/08, 24 May 2016). 
31 Ibid at §171. 
32 In Siliadin v France (73316/01, 26 July 2005) at §89, the Court characterised MC v Bulgaria as establishing 
that States were obliged both to ‘adopt criminal-law provisions which penalise the practices … and to apply 
them in practice’. Subsequently, at §112, the Court cited MC as establishing that ‘the Convention must be seen 
as requiring the penalisation and effective prosecution of any act [violating Articles 3 or 4]’. 
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stake, requires efficient criminal-law provisions. Children and other vulnerable individuals, in 
particular, are entitled to effective protection …’ (§150).33 
So up to this point, MC v Bulgaria sounds like a substantive violation analogous to A v United 
Kingdom due to the absence of effective deterrence before the event. However, as the judgment 
proceeds, it begins to sound more like a procedural violation due to ineffective investigation after 
the event, analogous to Assenov v Bulgaria (24760/94, 28 October 1998) and CAS and CS v Romania 
(26692/05, 20 March 2012) (neither of which found a substantive violation): 
In the light of the above, the Court's task is to examine whether or not the impugned 
legislation and practice and their application in the case at hand, combined with the alleged 
shortcomings in the investigation, had such significant flaws as to amount to a breach of the 
respondent State's positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. (§167) 
Here, the Court bundles the interpretation and application of the law (‘the impugned legislation and 
practice and their application in the case at hand’) together with the effectiveness of the 
investigation – not quite conflating positive and procedural obligations, but certainly not separating 
them out. The factors relied on in finding that the investigation was inadequate were strikingly 
similar to those present in CAS and CS v Romania. In both cases, the Court highlighted delays, 
failures to test evidence and confront witnesses, failure to make a ‘context-sensitive assessment’ of 
the evidence, and failure to take into consideration the particular vulnerability of young people and 
victims of sexual offences.34 The Court in MC v Bulgaria concluded: 
In sum, the Court, without expressing an opinion on the guilt of P. and A., finds that the 
investigation of the applicant’s case and, in particular, the approach taken by the 
investigator and the prosecutors in the case fell short of the requirements inherent in the 
States’ positive obligations – viewed in the light of the relevant modern standards in 
comparative and international law – to establish and apply effectively a criminal-law system 
punishing all forms of rape and sexual abuse. (§185) 
It is difficult to disagree with the Court’s conclusion in MC v Bulgaria that a violation had occurred; 
but it is possible to find fault with the manner in which it articulated this finding. Was it a substantive 
violation, due to restrictive practice in the interpretation and application of the laws governing rape, 
such that the chances of conviction were reduced to a level where the law did not provide an 
effective deterrent? Or was it a procedural violation, due to flaws in the investigation of the 
particular offences involved in this case? Or was it both? The similarities with CAS and CS v Romania 
are such that MC almost certainly involved a finding of a procedural violation; but it is unclear 
whether it also involved a finding of a substantive violation. And this matters: if a substantive 
violation is found, then the State has been found to bear part responsibility for the occurrence of the 
ill-treatment itself, and the general measures required of the State will be more extensive, taking on 
a preventive dimension rather than a purely investigatory one.35 
The potential for confusion is further illustrated by the extremely similar case of MGC v Romania 
(61495/11, 15 March 2016), which closely followed MC v Bulgaria, but with a crucial distinction: the 
                                                          
33 Compare with A v United Kingdom (25599/94, 23 September 1998) at §22: ‘Children and other vulnerable 
individuals, in particular, are entitled to State protection, in the form of effective deterrence, against such 
serious breaches of personal integrity …’ 
34 Compare MC v Bulgaria (39272/98, 4 December 2003) at §177-184 with CAS and CS v Romania (26692/05, 
20 March 2012) at §73-83. 
35 For a discussion of the system of general measures, see Council of Europe (2008) at 26-29. 
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perpetrator, although not convicted of rape, was convicted of the lesser offence of sexual 
intercourse with a minor. Most likely, the violation in MGC v Romania was just procedural, based on 
the failure to properly investigate whether the applicant had consented to the intercourse;36 but the 
bundling of substantive and procedural obligations together in the analysis allows for a plausible 
reading of the decision as having found a substantive violation on the basis that the perpetrator was 
convicted of a criminal offence deemed not serious enough to be a sufficient deterrent. This would 
be a significant extension of the principles set down to date on deterrence, and it is unsatisfactory 
that the judgment did not clarify whether this was what the Court was holding. 
The failure to adequately delineate substantive and procedural violations in these judgments leaves 
doubt as to the response demanded of the respondent States on foot of the violations found. Must 
the general measures include legislative reform of the criminal law; or an alternative interpretation 
and application of the law by the domestic courts; or a new approach to the investigation of 
offences, including such matters as procedural reforms in the handling of investigations or 
specialised training for investigating officers; or all of the above? As formulated, the judgments in 
MC and MGC do not make it sufficiently clear which of these reforms is essential to achieve future 
compliance with Convention obligations, which makes fulsome and effective execution of the 
judgment (and supervision of same by the Committee of Ministers) more challenging. This in turn 
increases the likelihood of repetitive applications involving the same State in the future. 
  
4. Remedies against the State 
Of the various inconsistencies arising in the child protection case law of the ECtHR, the most difficult 
to untangle is the approach of the Court to the question of whether a case in which a violation is 
found of Article 3 or 8 also involves a violation of Article 13 by virtue of a failure to provide the 
applicant with an effective remedy in domestic law.37 Numerous child protection cases have found 
with little difficulty that an Article 13 violation follows; while other judgments have expressly ruled 
out a violation of Article 13, often with little justification provided for this finding. As a starting point 
for this discussion, it is apposite to quote the text of Article 13 in full: 
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have 
an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been 
committed by persons acting in an official capacity. 
 
4.1 Scope of the Right to an Effective Remedy 
Article 13 does not entitle a victim to a remedy against a private actor (although, as seen in Part 2.1 
above, the provision of a remedy against a private actor may come within the scope of the State’s 
positive obligation to deter ill-treatment). In Z v United Kingdom (29392/95, 10 May 2001), the Court 
held that the right is to a remedy against the State on foot on any acts or omissions on the part of 
State officials or bodies involving the breach of Convention rights, and compensation for the non-
                                                          
36 See §72-74: ‘The investigation and its conclusions must be centred on the issue of non-consent … That was 
not done in the applicant’s case … the Court finds that the investigation of the applicant’s case and, in 
particular, the approach taken by the national courts, in the context of a lack of a consistent national practice 
in the field, fell short of the requirements inherent in the States’ positive obligations to apply effectively a 
criminal-law system punishing all forms of rape and sexual abuse against children.’ 
37 On Article 13, see generally Council of Europe (2013). 
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pecuniary damage flowing from the breach should in principle be part of the range of available 
remedies (§109). As such, the inability of the applicants to secure compensation before the national 
courts for the failure of State authorities to protect them from abuse (in violation of Article 3) 
grounded a separate violation of Article 13. The same line of reasoning was applied in O’Keeffe v 
Ireland (35810/09, 28 January 2014). The right to an effective remedy was found to also arise on foot 
of procedural violations due to inadequate investigations in Assenov v Bulgaria (24760/94, 28 
October 1998). Indeed, the case law goes so far as to establish that it may arise in cases not 
disclosing any substantive or procedural violation. In DP and JC v United Kingdom (38719/97, 10 
October 2002) (discussed in Part 2.3 above), a violation of Article 13 was found in circumstances 
where the applicants’ complaints raised arguable claims of violations of the Convention, but the 
applicants did not have available to them an appropriate means of obtaining a determination of 
their allegations that State authorities failed to protect them from serious ill-treatment or obtaining 
compensation for the damage suffered thereby (§136-138). 
Any remedies granted should clearly acknowledge fault on the part of the State. Thus, a criminal 
conviction of a perpetrator is not a sufficient remedy: in O’Keeffe, the Court specifically stated that 
the criminal conviction, while central to the procedural guarantees of Article 3, was not an effective 
remedy within the meaning of Article 13 the Convention (§179). The Court also stipulated that an 
award of damages arising from a civil action against the abuser was insufficient, as was an ex gratia 
payment from the Criminal Injuries Compensation Tribunal (§179). The latter was also found to be 
an inadequate remedy in Z v United Kingdom (§107-111). 
Article 13 is central to the underlying principle of the subsidiarity of the ECHR to national law. 
Coupled with the admissibility criteria set down in Article 35, it aims to keep cases away from the 
Strasbourg Court by requiring that States Parties provide a system in which violations of Convention 
rights can be effectively remedied before a national authority. As noted in Kudla v Poland (30210/96, 
26 October 2000): 
Article 13, giving direct expression to the States’ obligation to protect human rights first and 
foremost within their own legal system, establishes an additional guarantee for an individual 
in order to ensure that he or she effectively enjoys those rights. The object of Article 13, as 
emerges from the travaux preparatoires, is to provide a means whereby individuals can 
obtain relief at a national level for violations of their Convention rights before having to set 
in motion the international machinery of complaint before the Court. (§152) 
It is only where national authorities fail to provide a remedy that the ECtHR will become involved. 
On its face, the text of Article 13 seems clear that every case in which a remedy in domestic law was 
denied, but in which the applicant subsequently establishes a violation of a Convention right before 
the ECtHR, should involve a finding of a violation of Article 13. However, it will be seen below that 
multiple child protection cases depart from this interpretation. Since no explanation is provided in 
these cases for why the Article 13 complaint was rejected, it is necessary to briefly examine the 
broader body of case law on Article 13 so as to establish the limits of the right to an effective 
remedy, and consider whether or not a justification exists for the approach taken in the child 
protection cases. 
The case law on Article 13 is somewhat muddled on the question of whether every breach of a 
substantive Convention provision also entails a breach of Article 13. It has been suggested that 
Article 13 merely requires that a complaint regarding a breach of a Convention right be ventilated 
before a national authority, and not that a remedy actually be granted. In Pine Valley Developments 
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v Ireland (12742/87, 29 November 1991), a violation was found of Article 1 of the First Protocol 
(right to private property) taken together with Article 14 (freedom from discrimination). However, 
notwithstanding the fact that no remedy had been provided before a national authority for this 
violation, the Court declined to find a separate violation of Article 13. It was held that: 
The applicants not only could but also did raise the substance of their Convention 
complaints (including that relating to the discriminatory effect of the 1982 Act) before the 
Irish courts in the second Pine Valley case ... And it has to be recalled that the effectiveness 
of a remedy, for the purposes of Article 13 (art. 13), does not depend on the certainty of a 
favourable outcome (see, inter alia, the Soering judgment of 7 July 1989 …). (§66) 
This position seems difficult to square both with the text of Article 13 (which says that ‘[e]veryone’ 
whose rights are violated ‘shall have an effective remedy’, and not merely a potential avenue to 
pursue a remedy) and with other judgments of the Court. While the procedural obligation to carry 
out an effective investigation has been repeatedly described in the case law as an obligation of 
means, not one of result (i.e. it need not lead to a conviction),38 the obligation under Article 13 
seems more likely to be an obligation of result (i.e. an effective remedy must be provided). Multiple 
subsequent judgments have held that ‘[t]he effect of Article 13 is thus to require the provision of a 
domestic remedy to deal with the substance of an ‘arguable complaint’ under the Convention and to 
grant appropriate relief’.39 Surely, in any case disclosing a violation of a Convention right, the 
requirement to ‘grant appropriate relief’ applies, and not just a lesser obligation to allow the 
complaint to be ventilated?40 
Soering v United Kingdom (14038/88, 7 July 1989), cited by the Court in Pine Valley Developments, 
does not seem to provide sound authority for the decision. In Soering, a violation of Article 3 was 
found in respect of the proposed extradition of a prisoner from the UK to the US, where he was 
likely to face the death penalty following a considerable period of time on death row (§111). It is 
true that the Court declined to find a separate violation of Article 13; however, there is a crucial 
distinction between Soering and Pine Valley Developments. The Court in Soering pointed out that the 
applicant could have pursued judicial review of the extradition decision at a different point in time 
and relying on different grounds (§122). It was in that context that the Court observed that the 
effectiveness of a remedy does not depend on certainty of a favourable outcome. There had been a 
reasonable course of action available to the applicant in domestic law; he should have pursued it, 
and cannot complain of an absence of domestic remedies having failed to do so.41 
                                                          
38 See, e.g., CAS and CS v Romania, 26692/05, 20 March 2012 at §70. 
39 See, e.g., Conka v Belgium (51564/99, 5 February 2002) at §75, and Kudla v Poland (30210/96, 26 October 
2000 at §157). Lee (2015) at 34 states that ‘[t]he principle of effectiveness comprises two distinct aspects. It 
ensures, first, the availability of an effective mechanism for determining liability for breaches of Convention 
rights, and, secondly, the granting of relief in cases where breaches are well-founded … In this respect, Art. 13 
is closely linked with Art. 41 which provides for “just satisfaction”.’ 
40 See also Leander v Sweden (9248/81, 26 March 1987) at §77: ‘where an individual has an arguable claim to 
be the victim of a violation of the rights set forth in the Convention, he should have a remedy before a national 
authority in order both to have his claim decided and, if appropriate, to obtain redress’ (emphasis added). 
41 Note that even this position seems out of line with a strong line of ECtHR case law that has held that when a 
remedy has been pursued, use of another remedy which has essentially the same objective is not required: 
see, e.g., O’Reilly v Ireland (24196/94, 22 January 1996); TW v Malta (25644/94, 29 April 1999) at para 
34; Moreira Barbosa v Portugal (65681/01, 29 April 2004); Jeličić v Bosnia and Herzegovina (41183/02, 15 
November 2005); Shkalla v Albania (26866/05, 10 May 2011) at §61; Leja v Latvia (71072/01, 14 June 2011) at 
§46; and O’Keeffe v Ireland (35810/09, 16 June 2012 (Chamber)) at §85. 
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This is clearly distinguishable from the position in Pine Valley, where the applicants had 
unsuccessfully pursued multiple arguments all the way to the Supreme Court, and no alternative 
domestic remedy was identified by the Court (§12-27). Pine Valley Developments takes the Soering 
rule that you cannot claim a breach of Article 13 if you failed to pursue a potentially viable domestic 
remedy, and converts it into the very different rule that Article 13 does not require that you actually 
be granted a remedy before a national authority, provided that you had some outlet to ventilate 
your complaint. This position (if correct and applied rigorously) would make it almost impossible to 
establish a violation of Article 13 in the vast majority of cases, since the requirement under Article 35 
to exhaust domestic remedies means that almost all applicants to the Strasbourg Court will have 
ventilated their complaint in unsuccessful domestic litigation. Moreover, by deeming unsuccessful 
domestic litigation to be an ‘effective remedy’, it would require subsequent applicants in similar 
cases to pursue what would effectively be futile domestic litigation before taking a case to 
Strasbourg. This is out of line with the well-established ECHR principle that futile domestic remedies 
need not be exhausted.42 
 
4.2 Inconsistent Application of Article 13 in Child Protection Cases 
In the child protection case law, a number of clear examples suggest that Pine Valley Developments 
was incorrectly decided on this point. In Z v United Kingdom (29392/95, 10 May 2001), discussed 
above, the applicants (who social services had left in the family home, exposed to severe abuse and 
neglect, for several years) had pursued a claim in negligence against the local authorities all the way 
to the House of Lords (§57-68). On the face of it, to borrow the phrasing of the Court in Pine Valley 
Developments, they ‘not only could but also did raise the substance of their Convention complaints’ 
at the highest level in the domestic courts. But precisely because this domestic litigation ruled out 
the possibility of a remedy being granted, it was found that there was a violation of Article 13. The 
pattern in O’Keeffe v Ireland (35810/09, 28 January 2014) is extremely similar; again, the applicant 
had argued before the domestic courts at first instance and on appeal that the State bore partial 
responsibility for her abuse by a school principal, but her case was rejected (§22-48). And again, it 
was the very fact that domestic litigation did not provide her with an effective remedy that 
grounded a violation of Article 13. The State argued that alternative causes of action were available 
to her which could in principle have succeeded; but, in contrast to Soering, the Court found that 
these causes of action would not have succeeded even if pursued (§183-186). 
Both Z v United Kingdom and O’Keeffe v Ireland are therefore incompatible with any suggestion that 
the mere existence of an avenue to ventilate a complaint is sufficient to discharge the obligation 
under Article 13; on the contrary, they are more in line with a literal reading of the provision which 
requires that a remedy must actually have been granted (subject perhaps to the exception arising 
from Soering where a reasonable cause of action was not pursued). This would suggest that in any 
child protection case where a violation of Article 3 or 8 (or indeed Article 2 or 4) is found, and no 
effective remedy has been granted in domestic law (which is a given in cases before the ECtHR, since 
anyone granted an effective remedy can no longer claim to be a victim of a violation), a separate 
violation of Article 13 should follow. 
                                                          
42 See, e.g., Selmouni v France (25803/94, 28 July 1999) at §74 and A, B and C v Ireland (25579/05, 16 
December 2010) at §149. In Akdivar v Turkey (21893/93, 16 September 1996), it was held that where there 
was no evidence of State compensation having been provided in a single similar case to that before the court, 
there was therefore no need to exhaust domestic remedies. 
19 
 
However, other child protection cases depart decisively from this approach. While in some cases, the 
applicant rather curiously did not raise any issue under Article 13,43 there are a number of 
judgments in which Article 13 was relied on, but in which the Court expressly rejected the complaint 
that it had been violated. These cases are notable for the paucity (and, on occasion, complete 
absence) of any reasoning justifying the decision. For example, in MC v Bulgaria (39272/98, 4 
December 2003), the Court dismissed the Article 13 complaint in a single sentence: 
The Court thus finds that in the present case there has been a violation of the respondent 
State's positive obligations under both Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. It also holds that 
no separate issue arises under Article 13 of the Convention. (§187) 
The complete failure of the Court to articulate any reasons for its rejection of the Article 13 
complaint in this case is both disappointing and out of line with the express requirement in Article 
45(1) of the ECHR that ‘[r]easons shall be given for judgments as well as for decisions declaring 
applications admissible or inadmissible.’ 
Söderman v Sweden (5786/08, 12 November 2013) is not much better in this regard, although it 
hints at some sort of reasoning: ‘In the present case, it [i.e. the Court] considers that the applicant’s 
complaint concerns exclusively the remedies available to her against her stepfather, not those 
available against the State to enforce the substance of a Convention right or freedom at the national 
level’ (§57). Here, we see the Court trying to distinguish between remedies sought against the State 
and remedies sought against private individuals, holding that a violation of Article 13 would only 
arise in respect of the former. In simple terms, the applicant in Söderman never tried to sue the 
State in the domestic litigation. However, this distinction is unconvincing, in that the violation for 
which the State was responsible arose precisely out of its own inaction in failing to enact domestic 
laws that would have provided the applicant with a remedy against her stepfather, and its 
consequent failure to provide an effective deterrent against the type of rights violation seen in that 
case.44 
If responsibility for a violation lies solely at the feet of a private individual, with no State culpability, 
then it would make sense to say that there is no violation of Article 13 (or indeed any other Article) 
by the State. However, as soon as the State is found in breach of positive obligations (as it was in 
Söderman), then a violation of Convention rights has occurred for which the State is responsible. The 
plain text of Article 13 and the approach taken in Z v United Kingdom and O’Keeffe v Ireland would 
suggest that if no remedy for this violation has been afforded to the applicant before a national 
authority, a violation of Article 13 should follow. All three cases involved a failure by the State to 
discharge a positive obligation by implementing measures which might have prevented the ill-
treatment from occurring; and in none of the three cases was the applicant able to obtain a remedy 
                                                          
43 See, e.g., CAS and CS v Romania (26692/05, 20 March 2012); Eremia v Moldova (3564/11, 28 May 2013), and 
DMD v Romania (23022/13, 3 October 2017). Most curious in this regard in ES v Slovakia (8227/04, 15 
September 2009), where the applicant successfully secured a declaration of a breach of rights in the 
Constitutional Court. At §33, this was found (for the purposes of determining admissibility) not to be an 
effective remedy because no compensation was paid. If it was not an effective remedy for admissibility 
purposes, then most likely it would have been found not to be an effective remedy for the purposes of Article 
13; so although Article 13 was not pleaded in that case, it almost surely would have been successful if it was. 
44 See §117, in which the Court’s concluding reason for finding a violation of Article 8 was that ‘neither a 
criminal remedy nor a civil remedy existed under Swedish law that could enable the applicant to obtain 




before a national authority for this failure (which, as discussed earlier, should in principle include 
financial compensation).45 So why was a violation of Article 13 only found in two of the three? 
Thus, a principled dividing line cannot to be identified by reference to whether the violation 
occurred at the hands of the State or of a private individual; nor can one be situated at the dividing 
line between substantive and procedural violations, as is clear from Assenov v Bulgaria (24760/94, 
28 October 1998). In that case, the Court found that no substantive violation had occurred; but 
having found that there was a procedural violation, the Court held that this almost automatically led 
to a separate violation of Art 13: 
Where an individual has an arguable claim that he has been ill-treated in breach of Article 3, 
the notion of an effective remedy entails, in addition to a thorough and effective 
investigation of the kind also required by Article 3 …, effective access for the complainant to 
the investigatory procedure and the payment of compensation where appropriate … The 
Court refers to its above findings that Mr Assenov had an arguable claim that he had been 
ill-treated by agents of the State and that the domestic investigation of this claim was not 
sufficiently thorough and effective. It follows from these findings that there has also been a 
violation of Article 13 ... (§117-118) 
The contrast between MC v Bulgaria and Assenov seems particularly stark. In both cases, a 
significant part of the complaint was that allegations of ill-treatment had not been effectively 
investigated. This was upheld in both cases, for very similar reasons; but the complaint of a violation 
of Article 13 was quickly upheld in Assenov, but summarily dismissed in MC. 
Aside from the inconsistent approach to finding violations of Article 13, a further difficulty is a 
tendency in some judgments to blur the lines between the procedural obligation to investigate 
allegations of ill-treatment and the Article 13 obligation to provide a remedy for failures to deter or 
prevent ill-treatment. Some older cases had sown the seeds for this confusion by locating the 
obligation to investigate allegations of torture and ill-treatment in Article 13 rather than in the 
procedural limb of Article 3.46 This confusion has spilled over into several recent child protection 
cases. 
In VK v Russia (68059/13, 7 March 2017), the Court, having found both substantive and procedural 
violations following the ill-treatment of a child at a public nursery school, dismissed the Article 13 
complaint on the grounds that it raised the same issues as the procedural violation, and that it was 
thus unnecessary to examine it separately (§196). This ignores the fact that the applicant had not 
been able to obtain a remedy before a national authority for the failures that led to the procedural 
violation; while the question of whether the applicant been provided with an effective remedy for 
the substantive violation was completely ignored. In DMD v Romania (23022/13, 3 October 2017), 
while no violation of Article 13 was claimed by the applicant, a procedural violation of Article 3 was 
found, inter alia, due to the fact that the applicant did not receive compensation either for the ill-
treatment inflicted on him or for the delays in the investigation and prosecution of the ill-treatment 
(§47-48). The provision of compensation at national level is not normally viewed as a relevant factor 
to determining whether a substantive or procedural violation has occurred; whereas, as seen in Z v 
United Kingdom and O’Keeffe v Ireland, it is central to determining whether Article 13 has been 
violated. Thus, the judgment in DMD is unhelpful in its conflation of these issues. 
                                                          
45 Z v United Kingdom (29392/95, 10 May 2001) at §109. 
46 See, e.g., Aksoy v Turkey (21987/93, 18 December 1996) at §98. 
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The clearest example of confusion between procedural obligations and Article 13 in the child 
protection case law is Kemaloğlu v Turkey (19986/06, 10 April 2012), in which the applicants argued 
‘there had been no effective remedy capable of holding accountable those responsible for the death 
of their son’, who had frozen to death following the failure of a school principal to notify the 
transport provider that the school was closing early due to a snow storm (§30). The Court stated that 
it was ‘called upon to examine whether the available legal remedies, taken together, as provided in 
law and applied in practice, could be said to have amounted to legal means capable of establishing 
the facts, holding accountable those at fault and providing appropriate redress to the victims’ (§43), 
which shows the complaint to be directly analogous to the Article 13 complaint in Z v United 
Kingdom. Nevertheless, the Court chose to examine this complaint under the procedural limb of 
Article 2, ultimately finding a violation due to the excessive delays and ‘the failure of the domestic 
courts to hold accountable those responsible for the death of the applicants’ child and to provide an 
appropriate redress to the applicants’ (§46). Conversely, in DP and JC v United Kingdom (38719/97, 
10 October 2002), complaints of an ineffective investigation were considered under Article 13 rather 
than Article 3. Both of these cases appear to have incorrectly categorised these complaints. 
As with the inconsistent approach to demarcating substantive and procedural violations, the 
inconsistent approach to finding separate violations of Article 13 becomes most relevant in the 
context of the measures of implementation required of a State found to have violated the 
Convention. All cases involve both specific measures of execution (addressed to the applicant) and 
general measures of execution (addressed to the legal system and society at large). In the context of 
remedies, a successful applicant will be awarded just satisfaction by the Court (usually involving 
compensation) as a specific measure of implementation. Since this will happen whether or not a 
separate violation of Article 13 is found, and the level of compensation that the ECtHR awards is 
generally quite modest, it will most likely make little concrete difference to the applicant whether a 
separate violation of Article 13 is found (other than the personal satisfaction and vindication that 
this would bring). The issue is more pressing for other, similarly situated victims of ill-treatment. If a 
separate violation of Article 13 is found, then the State will be required, as part of its general 
measures, to take steps to provide a remedy (usually in the form of financial compensation) for 
victims whose case is clearly established, and to ensure that a mechanism exists whereby claims for 
compensation for ill-treatment analogous to the case adjudicated on can be heard by a national 
authority. An example of such a general measure of implementation is the redress scheme for 
victims of sexual abuse in primary schools established by the Irish Government in response to the 
judgment in O’Keeffe v Ireland.47 
However, if no separate violation of Article 13 is found, then there will be no general measures 
required of the respondent State to provide remedies to similarly situated victims. As a result, other 
victims would have to litigate their claims in the same way as the applicant in the original Strasbourg 
proceedings. Their prospect of doing so successfully will depend in large part on the extent to which 
judgments of the ECtHR are applicable (and taken seriously) in the domestic courts. If they are, then 
the precedent set in the relevant Strasbourg judgment may provide them with a winning argument 
(although they would still be forced to undertake the costs, delays and stress inherent in litigation, 
which can be avoided by an out-of-court redress scheme). But conversely, if ECtHR judgments are 
not applicable or influential in domestic courts, then it is entirely possible that subsequent applicants 
will, like the original applicant, be unable to secure a remedy at national level, and will be forced to 
                                                          
47 Government of Ireland (2018) at 9-11. 
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take a repeat application to Strasbourg. This is clearly out of keeping with the system of subsidiarity 
envisaged by the Convention, of which Article 13 is a crucial component.48 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has aimed to provide the first comprehensive sketch of the outlines of States Parties’ 
obligations under the ECHR to protect children from ill-treatment at the hands of private individuals, 
and to untangle a number of difficulties and inconsistencies arising from the case law to date. In 
doing so, the impressive scope of those obligations has been highlighted, including obligations 
arising before ill-treatment occurs (including effective deterrence and mitigation of risk); obligations 
to respond to ill-treatment that is ongoing; and obligations arising after ill-treatment has occurred 
(including procedural obligations to investigate complaints of ill-treatment, and an obligation to 
provide an effective remedy in domestic law for acts or omissions of the State that contributed to 
rights violations). The obligations recognised by the ECtHR over several decades of jurisprudence are 
strikingly coherent with (and, at times, expressly influenced by) Article 19 of the CRC; and they add 
to that body of material an element of concrete illustration provided by the factual matrices of the 
various cases that can serve as a valuable guide to States as to what they should and should not do 
in the sphere of child protection. 
While the scope of the obligations is impressive, the reasoning underpinning some of the judgments 
is somewhat less so, with confusion and inconsistency in evidence on a number of points. It was 
acknowledged in the introduction that this is not unique to this line of ECtHR case law, or even to 
the ECHR itself: the construction of positive obligations to protect individuals from rights violations 
at the hands of private actors has proven a difficult task across international human rights law 
(Hakimi, 2010). But that does not change the fact that the child protection case law contains various 
inconsistencies of the kind that the ECtHR aspires to avoid. Obvious and glaring inconsistencies 
should be addressed if the jurisprudence is to develop in an effective and coherent manner, 
especially where those inconsistencies have negative impacts on the human rights outcomes that 
will be achieved by the judgments. 
The fact that some cases find violations of both Articles 3 and 8, while others expressly exclude 
Article 8 once a violation of Article 3 has been found, is primarily a matter of rigour: any Court 
should seek to avoid anomalies of this nature, but nothing especially negative flows from this 
particular one. The same cannot be said of the Court’s failure to clearly and consistently distinguish 
between substantive and procedural violations, which is crucial to the framing of whether the 
State’s faults arose before, during or after the occurrence of the ill-treatment in question (and thus 
crucial to the framing of what is required of the State by way of execution of the judgment). The 
inconsistent approach to whether a separate violation of Article 13 is found is even more 
problematic. The case law often falls short of basic ECHR standards by failing to provide any reasons 
for the decision on this point, and the judgments that have declined to find a violation of Article 13 
create a situation where repeat cases for similar violations are likely to find their way to Strasbourg. 
                                                          
48 See Kudla v Poland (30210/96, 26 October 2000) at §155: if States fail to provide effective remedies, 
‘individuals will systematically be forced to refer to the Court in Strasbourg complaints that would otherwise, 
and in the Court’s opinion more appropriately, have to be addressed in the first place within the national legal 
system. In the long term the effective functioning, on both the national and international level, of the scheme 
of human rights protection set up by the Convention is liable to be weakened’. See further Council of Europe 
(2013) at 7-9.  
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This undermines the subsidiarity of the ECHR and the machinery for ensuring the execution of 
judgments. 
On the plus side, the above difficulties could be addressed quite easily. When lawyers argue that ill-
treatment violates both Articles 3 and 8, and the treatment is found to reach the Article 3 threshold, 
the cleanest solution would be to always decline to consider the alleged Article 8 violation unless 
some clearly distinguishable factual issue can be identified to separate out the violations. 
Substantive and procedural violations should be addressed separately, using headings that make 
consistent use of that terminology, so that it is always clear which limbs of the relevant provisions 
have been violated and why. This in turn will clarify what measures of implementation are required 
of the respondent State, as well as of other States Parties in future. And finally, in any case where 
Convention rights have been violated, and the applicant has not foregone some reasonable domestic 
remedy against the State, a separate violation of Article 13 should be found. This in turn will compel 
the respondent State, as part of its general measures, to provide remedies to similarly situated 
victims, which will serve to keep repeat litigation away from the Strasbourg court (as Article 13 is 
intended to ensure). 
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